Baseball Toaster was unplugged on February 4, 2009.
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1) using profanity or any euphemisms for profanity
2) personally attacking other commenters
3) baiting other commenters
4) arguing for the sake of arguing
5) discussing politics
6) using hyperbole when something less will suffice
7) using sarcasm in a way that can be misinterpreted negatively
8) making the same point over and over again
9) typing "no-hitter" or "perfect game" to describe either in progress
10) being annoyed by the existence of this list
11) commenting under the obvious influence
12) claiming your opinion isn't allowed when it's just being disagreed with
Moneyball was never about choosing statistical analysis over scouting, contrary to how some people interpreted it (whether or not they read it). It was about pursuing competitive advantages, often in the face of conventional wisdom, and certain kinds of statistical analysis were simply examples of this at the time.
At True Blue L.A., Andrew Grant makes an interesting argument that game stats are reaching their limit as a weapon for general managers, who will need to find other ways to make themselves useful.
Am I saying that we should go back to thinking Juan Pierre is a good player and that Bartolo Colon totally deserved that Cy Young award since he lead the league in wins? Of course not. I'm saying that an organization can no longer be primarily stats based and find any kind of success without having a gigantic payroll. I'm saying that there's very little competitive advantage to be gained from stats based analysis.
The problem is that there's too much information out there now. Ten years ago if you wanted to find something like expected BABIP you would have to hire and independent stat provider and do all the calculations around it yourself. Now, any jerk with a blog can go to The Hardball Times, plug four numbers into a spreadsheet and get an answer in seconds for free. Want to know the league leader in line drives allowed last year? Give Baseball Prospectus 30 bucks and find out the answer. This has lead to some great things. People out there can take this information, produce new and interesting studies, and give it away all for free. But when you can get all of this for the cost of a Baseball Prospectus subscription and a couple of books, why bother hiring someone to do the same thing?
Grant suggests that the pendulum has swung back in favor of scouting - while wondering about how well the two sides, which aren't meant to operate in exclusion of each other, can be further united.
For stat guys to mean more than 100 dollars worth of reading material and an internet cable, they need to change their ways and do more than the average blogger can do. I think the breakthrough will come from finding out someway to quantify scouting data, and how to incorporate that into projection systems. How much does a prospect's bat speed really matter? What flaws in pitching mechanics are fixable and what are career enders? Does someone's time in the 40 in high school mean anything at all? These are questions that you can't just answer with an internet connection, you need data that only a collection of big league scouts can acquire. The guys that are willing to embrace this kind of analysis are the ones that can thrive, and the ones that think knowing what SNLVAR stands for will gives them an advantage over anyone will fall by the wayside.
Major-league teams already explore this to some extent, obviously, but I suspect there's room for growth. And as a mediocre statistican and a beyond-terrible scout, I can see the sense of this.
Take Andruw Jones, for example. I have preached that based on his statistical record, in the context of what we know about major-league players, it's more likely that he's been in a slump that can be corrected through adjustments, rather on some career-ending bender. Not that he'll regain his peak, but that he can still be valuable. But if someone were able to make the same kind of objective evaluation of how he looks, if someone could remove some of the guessing and hope out the equation before deciding how much to pay or play him, that could be very relevant and persuasive.
In other words, instead of merely saying "Jones looks terrible at the plate," you actually have a measurement on a scale, or a placement on a graph, to show what his mechanical ailment is and how likely it is to be cured. You'd diagnose his swing like you diagnose an injury or illness.
Not that there isn't some mystery in treating health ... which leads to my own additional point. Another destiny still being manifested in baseball is the medical frontier. There remains a great deal of guesswork when it comes to how likely a player is going to be hurt and how long his recovery times will be. Medicine may always be a combination of art with science, but it's another area that may offer more opportunities for competitive advantage than things like on-base percentage do. The risk-reward ratio is still there for the tinkering.
Of course, this all presumes that you are paying to things like on-base percentage in the first place.
As I reread this post, I feel my writing is pretty muddled. But I just thought there were some issues here worth pondering.
Thank you, Jon. That's they way I read it, too. It's kinda funny to me the way some folks treat statistical analysis as pseudo-religious dogma. Stats are a tool. So is scouting. Pretty simple, really.
I liked the photo of the bike. Would that be difficult to ride solo?
Baseball teams are measured by numbers. The two most salient, from an ownership point of view, are wins and dollars. The aggregation of wins (itself an aggregation of runs, which are an aggregation of hits, walks, outs, etc.) cannot be studied without using numbers. Hence, any baseball study must bear some relation to numeracy.
If the "replacement-level sabermetricians" Andrew talks about improve dramatically, then they can indeed tell us most of what we want to know about established major league players. But the same RLS should know that in most cases a team is unlikely to screw up their purely-narratively-based evaluations of vets to such an extent that it will cost them more than a few wins in any season. The value of a non-RL sabermetrician to a major league team has to do with dense research where many variables have to be holistically considered. Sabermetricians are present to provide researched answers to questions of significance. In running a major league team, it is unlikely that you would want to ask your stat guy to research Andruw Jones, straight up, starting from scratch. You would instead ask your stat guy for how the system that they use and constantly update and revise values Jones, and secondarily you may ask for some research on questions relating to Jones - i.e., is there a cliff that older players fall off, how can we see it coming, and so forth.
Andrew's argument is similar (NOT the same) as an argument that greatly improved high schools would make universities irrelevant. While there would be many arguments as to the magnitude of such a change, and while there are of course thousands of social issues that a policy-maker would have to assess alongside such claims, it should be obvious that researchers can provide much new insight in any setting where they are given considerably greater access to research materials, data, and institutional support. I do not claim that this is always the result, but I just don't know what you two are saying.
On a completely unrelated note, I was at the game last night and I just had to post this minor piece of self-promotion: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vxbPGY2kSxw. My first foray into the YouTube world! My fiancee messed up our usual harmony at the end, but I'm sporting my Dodger Thoughts t-shirt! Woohoo!
Then, add in the consideration that the data that the field guys are collecting could be obsolete in a week. Young players are probably very inconsistent in their performance (not just in terms of results, but in terms of simple repetition of the same swing, the same release point, etc.). Nowadays, I imagine that a scout's job is to extrapolate from a very limited set of observations. What the geek scouts back home would need, just like the game-stats analysts, is lots and lots of time-series data. For that, we'd need thousands and thousand of new scouts, to collect data from (nearly) every game. Either that or cameras and computers everywhere that could calculate parameters of performance (sort of like the new GameDay pitch data) for every player and play.
I'm not saying it couldn't happen - just that there'd be a lot of resistance, that there'd be need for serious technological advances, and that, even then, it would be hugely labor intensive.
7 - As my second-to-last paragraph implied, obviously my argument is predicated on people having made fundamental use of the resources already out there. I'm not sure that there aren't 30 good analysts in the world - whether or not they're employed or listened to is another matter.
However few great sabermetric statisticians there are out there, I'd have guessed there are fewer great sabermetric medical analysts.
Just had to, huh?
Ach, who'm I kiddin'? It made me smile.
My post is asking whether or not the same principles that guide statistical analysis can or already are applied to scouting.
I'm glad you liked it. :)
I was just poking fun... I should work on my smileys :)
http://tinyurl.com/6q3too
Its a freebie from Baseball Prospectus and it probably was talked about last year.
And as for scouting... I don't doubt at all that a computer could eventually break down a swing or a pitching motion and statistically analyze the likelihood of success or injury. Perhaps it's scoutings turn to reemerge to gain an advantage beyond stats... until computers re-emerge to do a better job of analyzing how a player "looks".
I believe Blake DeWitt has artificially enhanced gumption.
I suppose you could set something up for players during batting practice and take a number of samples per year and categorize them by type of pitch. That should give you enough information to "correct" swings based on mechanics during successful periods.
If the McCourts wants to build apartments and condos on the property, they will need approval from several different City agencies. The area is not zoned for residential and the deed to the property prohibits housing and the conditional use permit for the property prohibits housing.
What I notice right now in baseball (and in other sports, and also in many organizations in various sectors, public or private) is that there's lots of research being done, lots of interesting avenues investigated, lots of new data acquired/created, but so much seems to be going to waste.
In a competitive environment like baseball (a microcosm of society in so many ways), some organizations do seem to work with a long-term plan. Others also seem to have a plan, but they can be very quick to dismiss it (and the people behind it) if the results are not there very quickly. Others seem to work without a plan (even though they might have one).
It seems to me that many organizations are wary of investing too much in a direction or another, and might prefer to be more cautious, waiting to see if something really works before investing themselves into it. And once they decide to invest themselves into an approach or another, it is really difficult for the organization to keep at it for a long time (or at least long enough for the results to really show), while that's what would be needed to reap the rewards. Most of the time, the organizations decide to go in another way really quickly if it doesn't work the way they wanted right here, right now.
Also, for some, 'too much information' seems to really have a paralyzing effect: instead of using information to support decision-making, information seems to support not making any decision at all...
That having been said, the Dodgers are clearly not incorporating any such insights to a significant extent in many of their major league personnel decisions. However, even on teams with obstinate GMs who will continue to make bad choices about major personnel decisions, there is still an enormous amount to be gained from sabermetrics in the amateur draft, international signings, and player development, not to mention other areas like coaching and advance scouting.
Just curious, is this a general observation, or are there examples you have in mind?
The table has turned however .. there are now so many numbers available that the skill (and possible competitive advantage) are in figuring out which numbers matter for which player and in making sense out of the ocean of numbers. I don't think anyone is doing either of those well yet, which is why the "scouting" intangible is increasing in importance again.
I see this pendulum swinging back and forth for quite a while, providing lots of internet discussion fodder it does!
Question for Ned Colletti:
A notable trend in MLB front offices today is to have at least one full-time statistical analyst (typically a person with a math degree) on staff. The World Champion Red Sox hired Bill James as a special assistant in 2003; they've given him two World Series rings since. The Padres, who seem to contend [more] often than their talent might indicate, employ Chris Long as "Senior Quantitative Analyst". Do the Dodgers have or have plans for a statistical analyst on staff?
By old_fogey_la@yahoo.com
A couple of our baseball operations staff members spend time doing statistical analysis. We believe that statistical analysis plays a role in decisions on players, but like reviewing their character, work habits, leadership abilities, injury history, it is part of the equation and not always the entire answer.
I doubt one should read too much into this, but is "a couple ... members spend[ing] time" equivalent to having a Chris Long, Ben Baumer, et al. on staff? It sure doesn't seem like LA makes it one person's full-time job. In any case, the claim is clear that the Dodgers do perform and weigh in statistical analysis; unsaid is how well and how much.
That's where analysts can have input: helping decision-makers use data in the correct way (like Will said in 7 about using the scouts and the statheads).
I can think of a former boss of mine who focuses on stats that really aren't meaningful (small sample size, answers to loaded questions, etc.) to justify inaction, while doing something would have been needed.
Like Homer Simpson said: "Oh, people can come up with statistics to prove anything, Kent. 14% of people know that."
http://tinyurl.com/5m44tg
I don't know that I agree with the method, but it's not bad.
If the choice is between having one scout who you know is excellent and having an infinite supply of data you don't know how to handle, you choose the scout because of the phenomenon deemed PBA. But the more obvious choice, costs permitting, is to hire a staff to analyze the data.
The bigger issue for teams is that they continue to hire/promote baseball people who have no apparent ability to find analytic talent. That is, people who may know much about baseball but do not have a sufficient level of familiarity, expertise, etc. to hire the right analysts/sabermetricians. For such executives, it is valid to make the PBA point, since they will likely not do a good job of getting the right people in baseball operations. However, that only begs the question of why major league teams are willing to hire front offices that do not know how to use statistical analysis and do not know how to staff to make up for it. This is likely related to the so-called Picasso effect - many baseball owners are involved in baseball because they want to be, not because they have an exquisite plan to make money or win the World Series and the ability to carry it out. As such, they're willing to run their franchise on misguided principles, just like people who get into the restaurant business because they like eating.
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